publications
"The Peril in Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups" forthcoming, Journal of Politics
"Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. forthcoming, Journal of Conflict Resolution.
"Where, when, and how does the UN work to prevent civil war in self-determination disputes?" with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. 2018. Journal of Peace Research. 55(3): 380-94.
"Crises and Crisis Generations: International Crises and Military Political Participation." 2017. Security Studies. 26(4): 575-605
"Words and Deeds: from Incompatibilities to Outcomes in Anti-government Disputes." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. 2017. Journal of Peace Research. 54(4): 468-83
"Resolving Civil Wars before they Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. 2017. British Journal of Political Science. 47 (3): 675-97
"Nonviolence as a Weapon of the Resourceful: From Claims to Tactics in Mobilization." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. 2015. Mobilization. 20 (4): 471-91
“Going Abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations.” with Victor Asal and Justin Conrad. 2014. International Organization. 68(4): 945-78
"Mediation, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. forthcoming, Journal of Conflict Resolution.
"Where, when, and how does the UN work to prevent civil war in self-determination disputes?" with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. 2018. Journal of Peace Research. 55(3): 380-94.
"Crises and Crisis Generations: International Crises and Military Political Participation." 2017. Security Studies. 26(4): 575-605
"Words and Deeds: from Incompatibilities to Outcomes in Anti-government Disputes." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. 2017. Journal of Peace Research. 54(4): 468-83
"Resolving Civil Wars before they Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. 2017. British Journal of Political Science. 47 (3): 675-97
"Nonviolence as a Weapon of the Resourceful: From Claims to Tactics in Mobilization." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. 2015. Mobilization. 20 (4): 471-91
“Going Abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations.” with Victor Asal and Justin Conrad. 2014. International Organization. 68(4): 945-78
Working Papers
"Generals in the Cabinet: Military Participation in Government and International Conflict Initiation." revise and resubmit, International Studies Quarterly
How do military officers in a national cabinet affect a state's likelihood of international conflict? We know little about how intra-regime variation in military involvement in government affects a state’s decision to use force—particularly in civilian-led regimes. I argue that higher levels of military involvement in civilian-led regimes increase the likelihood that a state will initiate international conflict, but this only occurs when military officers occupy positions outside of national defense. When the military intrudes into areas of civilian responsibility, it is indicative of the military becoming a political faction. This increases a state’s likelihood of using force through two mechanisms: The first is the diffusion of decision-making authority beyond a civilian leader. When military officers are deciders and not just advisers in a government, they have the ability to unilaterally escalate international tensions. The second mechanism is the politicization of the decision to use force. When the military is a political actor, civilian and military elites have added incentives to increase international tensions in order to strengthen their faction in intra-regime politics. I test this theory cross-nationally using data on the number and type of cabinet positions held by military officers and find strong support for the theory.
"Getting a Seat at the Table: Civil-Military Power-Sharing and Coup Propensity in Non-Democracies."
Why do coups happen and how can state leaders in non-democracies affect their likelihood? Existing research focuses on structural factors as well as institutional "coup-proofing" measures as drivers of coup risk. I argue that the literature misses an important alternative avenue by which non-democratic leaders can affect the likelihood that their militaries remove them from office: civil-military power-sharing. When leaders bring military officers into the government, they ameliorate a commitment problem inherent in non-democratic civil-military relations, provide confidence to the military that their policy preferences will be respected, and that future resource flows will be guaranteed. In contrast, removing military officers from government dramatically increases the risk of a coup attempt. I test this theory using extant data on coup attempts and a new cross-national dataset that captures changes in military representation in national cabinets and state councils from 1964-2008 and finds strong support for the theory.
"The Hazards of Victory: Conflict Outcome and Military Political Participation."
Following armed conflict, why do some militaries intrude into government, while others withdraw? I argue that the effect of international and domestic armed conflict on military involvement in government depends on conflict outcome. Victories lead to increased military participation in government, while defeat leads to a reduction. Victories give militaries leverage over governments, given the resources and prestige that come with victory. In contrast, defeated militaries can be scapegoated and marginalized politically while at the same time, factions in the officer corps may also push for professionalization and de-politicization of a defeated military. I test this theory on a new dataset of military participation in high-level governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong evidence that civil war victories contribute to significant increases in military involvement in government, while international defeats lead to substantial decreases. I find weaker evidence that the same pattern holds for international victories and civil war defeats.
How do military officers in a national cabinet affect a state's likelihood of international conflict? We know little about how intra-regime variation in military involvement in government affects a state’s decision to use force—particularly in civilian-led regimes. I argue that higher levels of military involvement in civilian-led regimes increase the likelihood that a state will initiate international conflict, but this only occurs when military officers occupy positions outside of national defense. When the military intrudes into areas of civilian responsibility, it is indicative of the military becoming a political faction. This increases a state’s likelihood of using force through two mechanisms: The first is the diffusion of decision-making authority beyond a civilian leader. When military officers are deciders and not just advisers in a government, they have the ability to unilaterally escalate international tensions. The second mechanism is the politicization of the decision to use force. When the military is a political actor, civilian and military elites have added incentives to increase international tensions in order to strengthen their faction in intra-regime politics. I test this theory cross-nationally using data on the number and type of cabinet positions held by military officers and find strong support for the theory.
"Getting a Seat at the Table: Civil-Military Power-Sharing and Coup Propensity in Non-Democracies."
Why do coups happen and how can state leaders in non-democracies affect their likelihood? Existing research focuses on structural factors as well as institutional "coup-proofing" measures as drivers of coup risk. I argue that the literature misses an important alternative avenue by which non-democratic leaders can affect the likelihood that their militaries remove them from office: civil-military power-sharing. When leaders bring military officers into the government, they ameliorate a commitment problem inherent in non-democratic civil-military relations, provide confidence to the military that their policy preferences will be respected, and that future resource flows will be guaranteed. In contrast, removing military officers from government dramatically increases the risk of a coup attempt. I test this theory using extant data on coup attempts and a new cross-national dataset that captures changes in military representation in national cabinets and state councils from 1964-2008 and finds strong support for the theory.
"The Hazards of Victory: Conflict Outcome and Military Political Participation."
Following armed conflict, why do some militaries intrude into government, while others withdraw? I argue that the effect of international and domestic armed conflict on military involvement in government depends on conflict outcome. Victories lead to increased military participation in government, while defeat leads to a reduction. Victories give militaries leverage over governments, given the resources and prestige that come with victory. In contrast, defeated militaries can be scapegoated and marginalized politically while at the same time, factions in the officer corps may also push for professionalization and de-politicization of a defeated military. I test this theory on a new dataset of military participation in high-level governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong evidence that civil war victories contribute to significant increases in military involvement in government, while international defeats lead to substantial decreases. I find weaker evidence that the same pattern holds for international victories and civil war defeats.
