publications
"Crises and Crisis Generations: International Crises and Military Political Participation." forthcoming, Security Studies
Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in government and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of 'acute' international crises rather than its 'chronic' threat environment. Poor outcomes—defeats or stalemates—in major international crises lead to professionalization and de-politicization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. A poor outcome creates pressure for military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years later due to generational shifts. As the "Crisis Generation" of officers become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization. They guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong support for the theory.
"Words and Deeds: from Incompatibilities to Outcomes in Anti-government Disputes." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. conditionally accepted, Journal of Peace Research
Although dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, violent and non-violent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. Recent comparative literature addressing the decision to use violent or non-violent tactics suffers from a number of important limitations. Some studies only include secessionist disputes, excluding conflict over government, which is more often the focus of non-violent campaigns. Others examine only large-scale mobilization, and ignore the earlier stage of organizational articulation of grievances. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims and whether we eventually see mobilization resulting in civil wars or non-violent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and non-violent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 100 states from 1960-2012.
"Resolving Civil Wars before they Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. British Journal of Political Science. (forthcoming)
A large literature has demonstrated that international action can promote the resolution of civil wars. However, international actors do not wait until violence starts to seek to manage conflicts. This article considers the ways in which the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reduces the propensity for self-determination movements to escalate to civil war, through actions that directly pertain to the disputing actors or that indirectly shape actor incentives. It examines the relationship between the content of UNSC resolutions in all self-determination disputes from 1960 to 2005 and the onset of armed conflict in the disputes. The study finds that diplomatic actions that directly address disputes reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, and that military force and sanctions have more indirect preventive effects.
"Nonviolence as a Weapon of the Resourceful: From Claims to Tactics in Mobilization." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. 2015. Mobilization. 20 (4): 471-91.
Recent events have renewed interest in different strategies in campaigns against non-democratic regimes and their outcomes. Most comparative work is limited to large-scale mobilization and takes violence/non-violent tactics as given, overlooking prior group mobilization and initial tactic choice. Tactic choice is plausibly related to group characteristics and resources, but large-scale campaigns lie at the end of a mobilization process, where groups first stake claims and learn about their potential. We propose a framework to understand the choice of specific tactics and when campaigns take on violent or non-violent forms. We focus on grievances and the origins of mobilization through formulation of claims marking disputes over regime type, government composition, and electoral legitimacy, independent of mobilization, and consider how resources provide a comparative advantage for violence or non-violence. An application to states in the former Soviet Union demonstrates the framework’s utility for understanding when claims evolve to violent and non-violent mobilization.
“Going Abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations.” with Victor Asal and Justin Conrad. 2014. International Organization. 68(4): 945-78.
Existing literature on contentious political movements has generally focused on domestic political activity. Using the new Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior–Middle East data set (MAROB-ME), which contains organization-level data for 104 ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, we analyze the decision of both violent and nonviolent organizations to engage in political activity transnationally. Among the results, we find that diaspora support is associated with transnational nonviolent protest, whereas foreign state support and domestic repression increase the use of transnational violence. The most robust finding, however, is that participation in the domestic electoral process consistently reduces the likelihood that an organization will engage in any political activity abroad.
Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in government and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of 'acute' international crises rather than its 'chronic' threat environment. Poor outcomes—defeats or stalemates—in major international crises lead to professionalization and de-politicization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. A poor outcome creates pressure for military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years later due to generational shifts. As the "Crisis Generation" of officers become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization. They guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong support for the theory.
"Words and Deeds: from Incompatibilities to Outcomes in Anti-government Disputes." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. conditionally accepted, Journal of Peace Research
Although dissidents can choose among different tactics to redress political grievances, violent and non-violent mobilization tend to be studied in isolation. Recent comparative literature addressing the decision to use violent or non-violent tactics suffers from a number of important limitations. Some studies only include secessionist disputes, excluding conflict over government, which is more often the focus of non-violent campaigns. Others examine only large-scale mobilization, and ignore the earlier stage of organizational articulation of grievances. We examine why some countries see the emergence of organized dissident activity over governmental claims and whether we eventually see mobilization resulting in civil wars or non-violent campaigns, while others see no large-scale collective action. We develop a two-stage theoretical framework examining the articulation of political grievance and then large-scale violent and non-violent collective action. We test implications of this framework using new data on governmental incompatibilities in a random sample of 100 states from 1960-2012.
"Resolving Civil Wars before they Start: The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. British Journal of Political Science. (forthcoming)
A large literature has demonstrated that international action can promote the resolution of civil wars. However, international actors do not wait until violence starts to seek to manage conflicts. This article considers the ways in which the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reduces the propensity for self-determination movements to escalate to civil war, through actions that directly pertain to the disputing actors or that indirectly shape actor incentives. It examines the relationship between the content of UNSC resolutions in all self-determination disputes from 1960 to 2005 and the onset of armed conflict in the disputes. The study finds that diplomatic actions that directly address disputes reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, and that military force and sanctions have more indirect preventive effects.
"Nonviolence as a Weapon of the Resourceful: From Claims to Tactics in Mobilization." with David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, Belen Gonzalez, and Dragana Vidovic. 2015. Mobilization. 20 (4): 471-91.
Recent events have renewed interest in different strategies in campaigns against non-democratic regimes and their outcomes. Most comparative work is limited to large-scale mobilization and takes violence/non-violent tactics as given, overlooking prior group mobilization and initial tactic choice. Tactic choice is plausibly related to group characteristics and resources, but large-scale campaigns lie at the end of a mobilization process, where groups first stake claims and learn about their potential. We propose a framework to understand the choice of specific tactics and when campaigns take on violent or non-violent forms. We focus on grievances and the origins of mobilization through formulation of claims marking disputes over regime type, government composition, and electoral legitimacy, independent of mobilization, and consider how resources provide a comparative advantage for violence or non-violence. An application to states in the former Soviet Union demonstrates the framework’s utility for understanding when claims evolve to violent and non-violent mobilization.
“Going Abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations.” with Victor Asal and Justin Conrad. 2014. International Organization. 68(4): 945-78.
Existing literature on contentious political movements has generally focused on domestic political activity. Using the new Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior–Middle East data set (MAROB-ME), which contains organization-level data for 104 ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, we analyze the decision of both violent and nonviolent organizations to engage in political activity transnationally. Among the results, we find that diaspora support is associated with transnational nonviolent protest, whereas foreign state support and domestic repression increase the use of transnational violence. The most robust finding, however, is that participation in the domestic electoral process consistently reduces the likelihood that an organization will engage in any political activity abroad.
Working Papers
"Getting a Seat at the Table: Civil-Military Power-Sharing and Coup Propensity in Non-Democracies."
Why do coups happen and how can state leaders in non-democracies affect their likelihood? Existing research focuses on structural factors as well as institutional "coup-proofing" measures as drivers of coup risk. I argue that the literature misses an important alternative avenue by which non-democratic leaders can affect the likelihood that their militaries remove them from office: civil-military power-sharing. When leaders bring military officers into the government, they ameliorate a commitment problem inherent in non-democratic civil-military relations, provide confidence to the military that their policy preferences will be respected, and that future resource flows will be guaranteed. In contrast, removing military officers from government dramatically increases the risk of a coup attempt. I test this theory using extant data on coup attempts and a new cross-national dataset that captures changes in military representation in national cabinets and state councils from 1964-2008 and finds strong support for the theory.
"The Peril in Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups"
The end of civil war presents a perilous situation for civil-military relations — there is a large, domestically-focused military without a job to do. The literature gives us a good understanding of how peace agreements and their provisions affect the chances that fighting between the civil war combatants resume. However, it misses another aspect of postwar conflict: the potential for the military to stage a coup attempt against the government. I argue civil war peace agreements pose a substantial risk of a coup attempt. In particular, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR), and power-sharing provisions that often accompany such agreements threaten to weaken the military and threaten its institutional interests. Because of this, the military may intervene in politics before the agreement can be implemented. I test this theory using cross-national data on civil war peace agreements and coup attempts and find strong support for the theory. States that have recently signed a peace agreement in a civil war are more likely to see a coup attempt, and this relationship is particularly strong for agreements that contain provisions related to SSR, specifically those that call for the integration of former rebels into the military.
"The Hazards of Victory: Conflict Outcome and Military Political Participation."
Following armed conflict, why do some militaries intrude into government, while others withdraw? I argue that the effect of international and domestic armed conflict on military involvement in government depends on conflict outcome. Victories lead to increased military participation in government, while defeat leads to a reduction. Victories give militaries leverage over governments, given the resources and prestige that come with victory. In contrast, defeated militaries can be scapegoated and marginalized politically while at the same time, factions in the officer corps may also push for professionalization and de-politicization of a defeated military. I test this theory on a new dataset of military participation in high-level governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong evidence that civil war victories contribute to significant increases in military involvement in government, while international defeats lead to substantial decreases. I find weaker evidence that the same pattern holds for international victories and civil war defeats.
"Does the United Nations Try to Prevent Civil War." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. revise and resubmit, Journal of Peace Research
Since at least the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been active in promoting the termination of civil wars. A large literature has examined the effects of these efforts. Yet, international actors, including the UN, do not wait until fighting starts to get involved in disputes between states and segments of their society. We examine the determinants of UN involvement in intrastate disputes by focusing on Security Council resolutions in self-determination disputes. We examine whether, outside of ongoing violence, the potential for regional contagion of violent conflict and a dispute's potential to escalate to violence affect the likelihood and type of UNSC resolutions. We find that the risk of contagion from neighboring violent conflicts as well as a past history of violent conflict increases UNSC involvement in disputes. This analysis shows that the UN acts proactively to prevent violence, rather than just reactively responding to existing violence.
"Diplomacy, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham.
A large body of literature has demonstrated that third-party actions such as peacekeeping and mediation can promote the resolution of conflicts. Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, however, and we examine whether actions such as peacekeeping, mediation, and other action by the UN Security Council lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. We find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. We also find that other third-party activity, especially mediation, can play important roles in reducing bloodshed. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battle-field fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers. These analyses show that third parties, such as the UN, can rely on a range of tools to reduce violence and suffering in intrastate conflicts and that the success of third-party interventions cannot be judged solely on the basis of their capacity to fully end conflicts.
Why do coups happen and how can state leaders in non-democracies affect their likelihood? Existing research focuses on structural factors as well as institutional "coup-proofing" measures as drivers of coup risk. I argue that the literature misses an important alternative avenue by which non-democratic leaders can affect the likelihood that their militaries remove them from office: civil-military power-sharing. When leaders bring military officers into the government, they ameliorate a commitment problem inherent in non-democratic civil-military relations, provide confidence to the military that their policy preferences will be respected, and that future resource flows will be guaranteed. In contrast, removing military officers from government dramatically increases the risk of a coup attempt. I test this theory using extant data on coup attempts and a new cross-national dataset that captures changes in military representation in national cabinets and state councils from 1964-2008 and finds strong support for the theory.
"The Peril in Peace: Civil War Peace Agreements and Military Coups"
The end of civil war presents a perilous situation for civil-military relations — there is a large, domestically-focused military without a job to do. The literature gives us a good understanding of how peace agreements and their provisions affect the chances that fighting between the civil war combatants resume. However, it misses another aspect of postwar conflict: the potential for the military to stage a coup attempt against the government. I argue civil war peace agreements pose a substantial risk of a coup attempt. In particular, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR), and power-sharing provisions that often accompany such agreements threaten to weaken the military and threaten its institutional interests. Because of this, the military may intervene in politics before the agreement can be implemented. I test this theory using cross-national data on civil war peace agreements and coup attempts and find strong support for the theory. States that have recently signed a peace agreement in a civil war are more likely to see a coup attempt, and this relationship is particularly strong for agreements that contain provisions related to SSR, specifically those that call for the integration of former rebels into the military.
"The Hazards of Victory: Conflict Outcome and Military Political Participation."
Following armed conflict, why do some militaries intrude into government, while others withdraw? I argue that the effect of international and domestic armed conflict on military involvement in government depends on conflict outcome. Victories lead to increased military participation in government, while defeat leads to a reduction. Victories give militaries leverage over governments, given the resources and prestige that come with victory. In contrast, defeated militaries can be scapegoated and marginalized politically while at the same time, factions in the officer corps may also push for professionalization and de-politicization of a defeated military. I test this theory on a new dataset of military participation in high-level governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong evidence that civil war victories contribute to significant increases in military involvement in government, while international defeats lead to substantial decreases. I find weaker evidence that the same pattern holds for international victories and civil war defeats.
"Does the United Nations Try to Prevent Civil War." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham. revise and resubmit, Journal of Peace Research
Since at least the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has been active in promoting the termination of civil wars. A large literature has examined the effects of these efforts. Yet, international actors, including the UN, do not wait until fighting starts to get involved in disputes between states and segments of their society. We examine the determinants of UN involvement in intrastate disputes by focusing on Security Council resolutions in self-determination disputes. We examine whether, outside of ongoing violence, the potential for regional contagion of violent conflict and a dispute's potential to escalate to violence affect the likelihood and type of UNSC resolutions. We find that the risk of contagion from neighboring violent conflicts as well as a past history of violent conflict increases UNSC involvement in disputes. This analysis shows that the UN acts proactively to prevent violence, rather than just reactively responding to existing violence.
"Diplomacy, Peacekeeping, and the Severity of Civil War." with Kyle Beardsley and David Cunningham.
A large body of literature has demonstrated that third-party actions such as peacekeeping and mediation can promote the resolution of conflicts. Conflict termination is just one goal of third-party interveners, however, and we examine whether actions such as peacekeeping, mediation, and other action by the UN Security Council lead to a reduction in violence in ongoing conflicts. We find, consistent with existing work, that a greater number of peacekeepers leads to a reduction in violence. We also find that other third-party activity, especially mediation, can play important roles in reducing bloodshed. In addition, we find that mediation increases the effect of peacekeeping troops in decreasing battle-field fatalities, particularly at low numbers of peacekeepers. These analyses show that third parties, such as the UN, can rely on a range of tools to reduce violence and suffering in intrastate conflicts and that the success of third-party interventions cannot be judged solely on the basis of their capacity to fully end conflicts.
